The Role and Influence of Interpretation in Hermeneutic-phenomenological Research by Vis, Jo-Ann
© Currents: New Scholarship in the Human Services, 2008 
___________________________________________________________
  







This article discusses the significance of interpretation and its role within 
qualitative hermeneutic-phenomenological inquiry. The discussion begins 
with a critical historical overview highlighting how the subject of 
interpretation emerged and was debated among the work of Husserl, 
Heidegger and Gadamer. Taken from historical as well as present day 
writings concerning interpretation, four interlocking elements; lived 
experience, meaning, understanding and language are presented as a way 





Qualitative research supports a process of understanding that involves a 
continual development. Coming to understand something requires shifts 
and changes as new experiences emerge. Equally important to the 
qualitative researcher is the idea that the researcher and participant are 
part of a unique interaction that shapes and informs understanding which 
involves the practice of interpretation. 
Many researchers in the area of qualitative research advocate for a 
method that involves creating a relationship through which description, 
interpretation and self-reflection can evolve (Gadamer, 2003; Kvale, 
1996; Smith, 1994; van Manen, 1997). Qualitative research methods 
provide alternatives to historical quantitative options. Although human 
sciences in the past have relied heavily on quantitative methods to 
develop policies, theory and therapeutic interventions these types of 
research studies also have their limitations. Researchers advocate that 
qualitative research emphasizes process and meanings, noting the 
importance of the relationship between the researcher and the participant. 
The goal is not just to describe a phenomenon, but to live it, experience it, 
and to use the interpretation of this experience as a basis of knowing. 
Therefore, interpretation not only has its influence within everyday 
situations and interactions, but interpretation also influences our 
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understanding of our lived world and ourselves. How we come to 
understand what we know and what is important to know involves many 
levels of interpretation. 
Interpretation is something that is frequently discussed in 
hermeneutic-phenomenological research literature, but is not easily 
translated into concrete action. The following discussion takes into 
consideration the historical significance of interpretation, how it had 
evolved, and how it continues to evolve in present day inquiry. The 
discussion ends with the author’s perspective of how interpretation 
influences the conduct of research based on her own experience, as a way 
to add to growth and evolution of hermeneutic phenomenology inquiry. 
 
Husserl’s Idea of Interpretation as it Affects the Conduct of Research 
 
It was Husserl’s beginning work that inspired many different types of 
phenomenology. Smith (2002) describes Husserl as a key figure in 
hermeneutics. However, others knew Husserl as the originator of 
phenomenology and his work as leading the way to understanding the 
complexity of interpretation. Smith argued that Husserl was one of the 
first researchers to recognize the responsibility researchers have in 
recognizing and at times correcting false interpretations when they arise, 
challenging the researcher to be always vigilant to the influence of 
interpretation and the fragile state of self-understanding. 
As presented by Husserl, phenomenology was a new method 
envisioned to influence or offer new possibilities to philosophy and 
science. According to Spiegelberg (1975), Husserl contended that “all 
being and even all meaning have their ‘origin’ in subjective 
consciousness” (p. XXII). This vision allowed Husserl to follow his own 
passion and challenge himself to work or conduct research within what he 
would describe as “pure phenomenology.” Husserl attempted to develop 
the idea of phenomenology from a philosophical construct to that of a 
“rigorous science.” He believed that phenomenology would provide a 
way to describe lived experiences scientifically. In the process, Husserl 
produced a method termed “Transcendental Phenomenology.”  This 
method was developed in an attempt to control, if you will, the 
researcher’s subjectivity by placing it as a given reality. A “suspension of 
belief” by the researcher was required as a way to distinguish the 
researcher’s subjective interpretation of the phenomenon from that which 
was described or researched (“epoche,” or what was later termed 
“bracketing”). This method would require the researcher to challenge 
her/his otherwise passive acceptance (or denial) that the context or reality 
of her/his life will affect the interpretation of what was learned. As such, 
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the researcher is instructed to contemplate how the context of her/his life 
would influence what is seen or described (Spiegelberg 1975). 
Of course, critics of Husserl challenged his ideas regarding 
transcendental phenomenology by stating that the very notion of being 
objective regarding one’s own subjectivity was impossible, if not absurd. 
Jardine (1998) talks about how “Husserl’s work fell prey to the old 
options of inquiry, the old extremes” (p. 25). He goes on to blame 
Husserl’s own fixation with the development of phenomenology as being 
a rigorous science, in which he assumed too much. Jardine (1998) 
questioned whether Husserl’s attempt to draw out essences and his belief 
that commonalities among experiences exist, led him to ignore the 
complexity of interpretation and subjectivity as it related to other 
possibilities. Jardine (1998) offers this quote from Ludwig Wittgenstein 
as an example: 
 
As in spinning a thread, we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength 
of the thread does not reside in that fact that one fibre runs 
through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibers 
(Wittgenstein 1968, p. 32). Don’t say: “There must be something 
common (some essence, some univocal core of meaning)” but 
look and see whether there is anything that is common to all – 
For if you look at them you will not see something that is 
common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series 
of them at that. To repeat: don’t think but look! (p. 26). 
 
In this sense, Husserl’s idea of interpretation is that it exists, but can 
also be controlled or defined. It could be argued that Husserl was caught 
between his vision of phenomenology and its potential to become a 
rigorous science, minimizing the complexity of interpretation. As a result, 
the idea of interpretation was recognized, but its presentation appeared 
limited by the assumption that interpretation could be controlled as a way 
to observe as well as describe life experiences. 
Despite disagreements with some of Husserl’s concepts, Spiegelberg 
stated that it was because of his interaction with Husserl’s writings that 
his own ideas and interpretations of phenomenology began to emerge. 
Regardless of the critical reactions, Husserl’s original thinking sparked 
many debates and expanded phenomenology to include many other types 
of phenomenological approaches used in qualitative inquiry.  
 
Heidegger’s Idea of Interpretation as it Affects the Conduct of Research 
 
Heidegger did not see his role as defining phenomenology. In fact, he 
believed that doing so would hamper emerging possibilities and new 
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insights, and would stop phenomenology from growth and evolution. 
Spiegelberg (1975) noted and agreed with Heidegger that phenomenology 
cannot point to a single foundational moment; rather it undergoes a 
continuing growth process. He goes on to suggest that Heidegger would 
also agree that phenomenology could be seen more as a possibility rather 
than an actuality. 
As noted by many sources, it was the work of Husserl that also 
inspired the work of Martin Heidegger (Palmer 1969; Spiegelberg 1975; 
Jardine 1998; Smith 2002). Through exposure to Husserl’s work 
Heidegger began to question whether the “meaning of beingness” could 
be truly captured, or even should be captured by Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology. Through this questioning he began to develop 
hermeneutic phenomenology, a concept used by Heidegger to address the 
experience of being-in-the-world. It appears that Husserl would agree 
with Heidegger that “intentional consciousness” was a phenomenon 
worthy of further exploration. However, how they felt this exploration 
should transpire and the purpose in exploring this phenomenon differed. 
Although both scholars would agree that interpretation of a phenomenon 
was part of being in the world, and part of understanding this being, 
Husserl argued that this concept was one that could be “found” or 
“described” through the use of transcendental reduction (bracketing). 
Heidegger, however, appeared to move more towards the idea of the 
process of interpretation itself, as one experiences it, or rather “the 
position to interpret for us the meaning of human existence” (Spiegelberg 
1975, p. 69). 
In his work Being and Time (1962), Heidegger used the term 
hermeneutics differently from interpretation of text or methodology, 
which were more traditional uses. He expanded this term to include 
interpretation as being a natural process of understanding, or as a way to 
understand or make meaning of the world around us. Through his work 
he developed an investigative model that was interpretive of both content 
and method (Palmer 1969). 
Smith (2002) cites Heidegger’s work as being influential regarding 
the idea of interpretation as it relates not only to being, or living, but also 
alludes to the challenges inherent in the language used to describe this 
being: 
 
Because “language is the home of being,” said Heidegger, 
attending to language, and our use of it, becomes the primary 
means for understanding the operation of being in the world. 
However, all attempts to describe my being-in-the-world 
themselves participate in a dual action of disclosure and 
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concealment; the more I think I understand something, the more 
it slips away from me (p. 5). 
 
In this respect it appears that Heidegger too recognized the 
significance of interpretation. His idea of interpretation affected his 
approach in hermeneutic-phenomenological work, by involving the 
understanding or the acceptance that how one sees the world depends on 
how one interprets it. Heidegger goes on to discuss the complexity of 
interpretation, and includes language as another layer connected to 
interpretation used to describe our understanding, noting that 
understanding then is linguistic (Palmer 1969). Heidegger presents the 
concept of interpretation as something that cannot be captured. As a 
result, interpretation allows for an experience to be described in a 
research setting, but it is actually a new interpretation created between the 
researcher and the participant that is presented. 
 
What discloses itself is the being of the object as it is disclosed 
to understanding. To speak of the being of a thing as it “actually 
is” is to indulge in metaphysical speculation: as it is for whom? 
There is not a human perspective from which one can say what a 
being actually is (Palmer 1969, p. 229). 
 
Even in this regard, Heidegger continued to expose the many layers 
of interpretation. He noted that even when the researcher and the 
researched are engaged in understanding the meaning or experience of a 
certain phenomenon, they are not free from previous influences of others. 
In other words, our interpretations are not entirely our own, but 
influenced by shared and historical experiences. 
 
The subject understands through the world of understanding 
already given in and through his language and the historical 
positionality in which his understanding stands. To call this 
subjective or to trace it back to the individual consciousness is 
untenable, since the individual did not create the shared 
understanding and language but only participates in them 
(Palmer 1969, p. 229). 
 
Gadamer’s Idea of Interpretation as it Affects the Conduct of Research 
 
Hans-Georg Gadamer continued to build on the work of Heidegger 
regarding the concepts of history and language. Gadamer (2003), argued 
that what we experience as human beings depends on our history as well 
as our present; and that the language that is chosen to describe that 
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experience is just as significant as the experience itself (Smith 1994). 
Within this context Gadamer discussed the concept of prejudice or pre-
judgment as a way to uphold the perspective that one can only come to 
understand or make sense of the world (interpret) through our own past. 
In conversation with others, through the use of language, the combined 
past and present experience and the language to communicate this 
experience to others creates a new level of interpretation or 
understanding. 
 
For Gadamer, prejudice (pre-judgment) is not a swear word, but 
rather a sign that we can only make sense of the world from 
within a particular “horizon” which provides the starting point 
for our thoughts and actions. Understanding between persons is 
possible only to the degree that people can initiate a conversation 
between themselves and bring about a “fusion” of their different 
horizons into a new understanding, which they then hold in 
common (Smith 1994, p. 110). 
 
Adding to this, Gadamer offers the concept of language as another 
layer of interpretation, arguing that not only is there interpretation 
involved in what we experience, but also in the language we choose in 
sharing this experience (Palmer 1969; Kvale 1996). 
Gadamer, as described by Smith (1994), is “the last writer of a 
hermeneutics of continuity, a hermeneutics which attempts to hold the 
structure of understanding together within a language of understanding” 
(p. 111). Building on the ideas presented by Heidegger, Gadamer adopts a 
more finely tuned idea of how interpretation would affect the conduct of 
research in phenomenological work. Gadamer continually discusses the 
challenge of the researcher and researched to use interpretation as a way 
to develop new understanding. This is done through an intertwined, 
ongoing process versus a step-by-step procedure. First Gadamer 
challenges researchers to examine their use of language and their 
appreciation of its use in conversation. Then Gadamer discusses the need 
for recognition of interpretation and its place in our life. Understanding 
how we have come to be interested in the phenomenon, or recognition of 
prejudice, is part of this process. An equally important concept is the 
willingness to engage in a dialogue or a “dialogical journey” for the 
purpose of creating meaning as opposed to merely reporting it. Finally, 
Gadamer challenges the researcher to a continual commitment to deepen 
her/his own understanding throughout the process (Smith 1994). 
As a result, interpretation challenges the researcher and researched to 
become involved in a co-creation of new meanings and possibilities 
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regarding the phenomenon of interest. In this way, interpretation is sought 
out and maximized to include past, present, and future. 
 
The Possibilities of Interpretation: A Present Day Perspective 
 
Phenomenology and hermeneutics in their pure senses offer different 
ways or aspects of obtaining knowledge. These methods also differ 
regarding what is worth knowing, or how to go about obtaining 
knowledge. Regardless of the differences, it is the similarities and 
complementary components that are worthy of further exploration. It is 
the similar elements that offer important insight into the complexity and 
importance of interpretation as it relates to hermeneutic-
phenomenological inquiry. 
Upon review of the historical and present day debates regarding 
interpretation it appears that there are four main elements that continue to 
emerge in the literature which are connected to interpretation: lived 
experience; meaning; understanding; and language. 
When it comes to the idea of interpretation, this author argues that 
these four elements cannot exist without the other. Using the analogy as 
presented by Wittgenstein, (as cited by Jardine, 1998) how life is 
experienced influences the meaning that one attaches to those 
experiences. How one comes to understand those experiences include the 
influence of one’s lived experience, as well as a continual evolving 
experience that emerges through communication with others. At times 
individuals may find one’s experience affirmed, whereas at other times 
these interactions offer alternative views that one may choose to accept or 
ignore. This seems to be all a matter of interpretation. How one then 
chooses to communicate one’s experience also involves a continuation of 
interpretation through the use of language or another means. How others 
accept an individual’s communication involves further interpretation, 
based on their own lived experience, shades of meaning, and 
understanding of what one attempts to communicate. 
Max van Manen (1997) provides an example of the above argument 
by using a phenomenon such as time: 
 
A more famous philosophical example concerns the experience 
of time. What could be more easily grasped than time? We 
regulate our lives by time. We carry the time around on our 
wrist. We divide the day into morning, afternoon, evening and 
night time. And we reflect on past time and anticipate the time to 
come. We even talk about the time going by, sometimes fast, and 
at other times more slowly. And yet, when someone asks us 
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“what is time anyway?” we are quickly at wit’s end to describe it 
(p. 77). 
 
Here van Manen talks about our “pre-reflective lived understanding” 
of the meaning of time. One could also add that the words chosen, or the 
dialogue through which the conversation of time is held, also includes a 
level of interpretation by both the giver and the receiver of that “text,” in 
whatever form it eventually emerges. 
So how does interpretation affect the conduct of research in 
hermeneutic-phenomenological work? Smith (1994) asks the same 
question, but argues that the answer lies more in the experience of what 
interpretation has to offer us throughout the process of knowing versus 
absolute knowing. 
 
One of the most important contributions hermeneutics makes to 
all contemporary social theory and practice then, not just to 
curriculum and pedagogy, is in showing the way in which the 
meaning of anything is always arrived at referentially and 
relationally rather than (for want of a better word) absolutely. 
The final authority of concepts, constructs, or categories does not 
reside in the concepts themselves but within the dialogically 
arrived at agreement of people to consent to them (p. 119). 
 
Smith (1994) advocates for a practice that supports the reality of 
interpretation, requiring an outcome that is reflective of the people 
involved in the dialogue. He argues that by ignoring the influence of 
interpretation we run the risk of imposing our own views through the use 
of a privileged voice. As a result, we risk ignoring the many possibilities 
that combined knowing could produce. 
Benner (1994) shares Smith’s (1994) perspective regarding respect 
for similarities and differences between the researcher and the 
participants. They suggest that while the interpreter can never ignore 
one’s own influence of understanding, the researcher is also challenged 
through dialogue and listening to include the participant in a way that 
allows her/his voice to be heard or noticed. This perspective describes the 
opening up of possibility that exists through interpretation at both the 
phenomenological and hermeneutic levels. This includes not only the 
study of phenomena through experience, which includes a natural 
interpretation, as noted by Husserl, but also the impossibility of 
bracketing or separating out our interpretations of our lived experience, as 
acknowledged by Heidegger. Heidegger challenged us as researchers not 
to control our sense of interpretation, but include it as part of an evolving 
knowing experience. Taking it one step further, Gadamer adds the 
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concepts of language, prejudice, and creation of new meaning as other 
considerations in the interpretative process. Together, these thoughts 
formulate a possibility that continues to evolve through interpretation and 
the experience of that interpretation. 
Many other authors in the area of hermeneutics, phenomenology, 
interpretive research, or a combination thereof, utilize the unique ideas 
regarding interpretation as presented by past scholars (Palmer 1969; 
Spiegelberg 1975; Benner 1994; Jardine 1998; Smith 2002). In most 
cases it appears that contemporary authors themselves grapple with the 
distinction between phenomenology and hermeneutics, and focus on 
issues of interpretation as the glue that holds them together. David Smith 
(2002) states the obvious: 
 
In a way then, engaging in hermeneutic activity is simply the 
ordinary work of trying to make sense of things we don’t 
understand, things that fall out of our taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the nature of experience. As Heidegger 
(1962) said in Being and Time, “Interpretation is the primordial 
work of Being,” (p. 43); so really, everyone is a hermeneut” (p. 
1). 
 
How Interpretation Affects the Conduct of Research in 
Phenomenological–hermeneutic Work 
 
So what does it mean to be a researcher in the area of hermeneutic-
phenomenological work? Going back to Heidegger’s vision, it appears 
that phenomenological research has and will continue to evolve. 
Hermeneutic- phenomenological research supports an approach that is 
more about being and experiencing, rather than harnessing methods that 
would produce a certain outcome or finding as absolute. However, 
regardless of the lack of direction in the link between being and 
experiencing, there are some consistent views about hermeneutic –
phenomenological research work that have continued to receive attention. 
Concepts such as lived experience, meaning, understanding, and 
interpreting all are noted in one way or another by various authors 
(Benner 1994; Kvale 1996; van Manen 1997; Smith 2002). These authors 
agree that coming to understand something involves a continual process, 
changing and shifting as new experiences emerge. The other agreement, 
as noted previously, is the idea that the researcher and participant are part 
of a unique interaction that develops this understanding or interpretation. 
Therefore the goal is not to just describe a phenomenon but to live it, 
experience it, and to use the interpretation of this experience as a basis of 
knowing. This approach challenges the researcher to conduct 
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herself/himself in such a way as to include herself/himself in the process, 
as apposed to an attempt to be objective through the bracketing of pre-
lived experience, a concept that differentiates hermeneutic-
phenomenological work from that of pure or traditional phenomenology. 
Similarly, the researcher is challenged to look at the idea of 
interpretation as it relates to the relationship between the researcher and 
participant, as a way to understand how meaning is interpreted through 
language or other modes of communication. 
Smith (2002) describes hermeneutics as being about understanding 
or, more specifically, understanding about life. According to him, this is a 
move away from the hermeneutic tradition of focusing on text. 
As discussed throughout this essay, conducting hermeneutic-
phenomenological research involves the researcher and the researched in 
a very personal pre-judged way. In this approach, pre-judgment is not 
seen to be negative or something to control, but a reality that is embraced 
and used to the full advantage, starting at the beginning point of the 
research question. In this way, researchers ask themselves what 
experience or interest led them to ask the question. Bergum (1989) offers 
this summary: “That is, I, as a researcher, cannot place myself outside the 
problem I formulate. For me, the posing of my question was not 
something I had to search out. It came from my life” (p. 45). It is within 
this perspective that the researcher begins the process by asking how 
she/he was drawn to or interested in this experience, as a way to 
understand the meaning of this experience as it relates to the research 
question. 
Once the question has been formulated, the process of hermeneutic-
phenomenological research continues through relationship with the 
phenomenon that is to be understood, as interpreted by those who have 
lived the experience. The “how to” regarding the conduct of this type of 
inquiry is also a bit paradoxical, as I question whether 
phenomenological–hermeneutics can actually be “conducted” in the 
traditional sense of the word in the context of research.  It appears to me 
that the “how to” relates more to a process, an evolving experience that 
will unfold. Gadamer (2003) himself notes that the fundamental nature of 
a question is the openness to emerging possibilities related to that 
question. It seems that this is a debate that currently exists within the 
hermeneutic- phenomenological research field, similar perhaps to what 
Husserl and Heidegger would discuss. Is it possible to set up guidelines in 
such a way as to teach or provide a model through which hermeneutic-
phenomenological research can be practiced, or would doing so limit the 
possibilities that could emerge? David Jardine (1998) offers an argument 
for the latter: 
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This is not to say that phenomenology has no desire. Rather, its 
desire is not redemptive. It does not want to redeem everyday life 
through the application of methods that will render it presentable 
according to some imagined form of clarity and distinctness. Its 
desire is not to render our experience of the world, but to give a 
voice to it (p. 19). 
 
While following a step by step procedure for conducting 
hermeneutic-phenomenological research may initially appear to offer 
solace to the beginning hermeneutic researcher, to do so would 
undermine the integrity of the method itself. Attempting to apply a 
scripted process to a research method whose ontological quest is to open 
up possibilities and encourage co-creation of new ideas that emerge 
between unique individuals through the act of interpreting, is somewhat 
paradoxical. As such, many scholars have devoted their efforts to 
challenge hermeneutic-phenomenological researchers to pay more 
attention to the philosophy of the approach as method rather than the 
development of a method itself. 
 
My Own Lived Experience: How I Believe Interpretation Affects My 
Conduct of Research in Phenomenological–hermeneutic Work 
 
Many researchers, who have applied a hermeneutic, phenomenological, 
or a mixed hermeneutic-phenomenological methodology, agree that no 
specific method or procedure exists. Rather, it is the process itself that 
contributes to a method that evolves during the research process, based on 
a set of guidelines and principles developed throughout history (Colaizzi 
1978; Smith 1994; Kvale 1996; van Manen 1997; Creswell 1998). Van 
Manen (1997) offers a brief but powerful statement repeated by many 
who have applied a hermeneutic phenomenology method: 
 
So in a serious sense there is not really a “method” understood as 
a set of investigative procedures that one can master relatively 
quickly. Indeed it has been said of the method of 
phenomenology and hermeneutics that there is no method! 
(Gadamer, 2003; Rorty, 1979). And yet, phenomenology wants 
to claim that it can have it both ways. While it is true that the 
method of phenomenology is that there is no method, yet there is 
a tradition, a body of knowledge and insights, a history of lives 
of thinkers and authors, which taken as an example, constitutes 
both a source and a methodological ground for present human 
science practices (p. 30). 
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So how do I believe the idea of interpretation affects my conduct of 
research in hermeneutic-phenomenology? I have come to realize through 
my own process of understanding that the lack of a prescribed method is 
bitter-sweet: bitter in a sense for researchers, like myself, who attempt to 
take on a method that offers little direction and challenges one to leave 
her/his predominate culture and way of knowing at the door; sweet in the 
sense that this new way of inquiry provides new opportunities, ways of 
knowing and beliefs about what is worth knowing.  
 
It is a different way of understanding ourselves and our place in 
the world, one which problematizes our aspirations to clarity, 
progress, mastery, and dominance as images of our relation to 
the Earth and to each other. It brings inquiry out from under the 
desire for the final Word; it opens us up for the rebirth and re-
enlivening of the Word in the soul, with the full richness and 
ambiguity that such re-enlivening requires (Jardine 1998, p. 19). 
 
Van Manen (1997) suggests that to engage in hermeneutic 
phenomenology one must be influenced by phenomena that seriously 
interests us and commits us to the world. This would include a sense of 
prejudice (pre-judgment), as described by Gadamer (2003) which 
welcomes and seeks to incorporate what the researcher her/himself brings 
to the process. Within this context, van Manen (1997) challenges us to 
conduct our research by investigating experience as we live it rather than 
how we conceptualize it. The challenge, discussed more clearly by Smith 
(1994), is to create meaning versus simply reporting on it. He states that 
this is what separates hermeneutic inquiry from that of other descriptive 
approaches. What I choose to discuss depends on a collective 
understanding between the participant and myself versus selecting ideas 
that are important only to me. This process creates a new understanding 
that promotes the uniqueness of each of us (researcher and participant), 
and what we have co-created. It is this dialogue, interpretation, feedback, 
continued dialogue, and interpretation that create a never-ending process 
of new information and possibilities. Kvale (1996) describes this best, not 
in words, but in a picture shown in each chapter of his book InterViews 
that depicts a flowing interface between the many different levels of 
involvement in any interpretative process, including the researcher, 
participant, and readers of the text. 
Smith (1994) notes, that any type of hermeneutic inquiry must 
include some sense of the researcher’s experience and transformation, 
throughout the process of the inquiry. The research method itself requires 
a commitment to the process of evolution rather than following a 
prescribed set of procedures (Colaizzi 1978; Smith 1994; Kvale 1996; van 
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Manen 1997; Creswell 1998; Patton 2002). Kvale (1996) talks about 
“conversations” or “wandering” with participants as a way to understand 
her/his lived experience. This conversation is a way in which text is 
created that provides a true reflection and uniqueness of the very persons 
involved in the conversation. It is within this text that new meanings and 
possibilities can emerge. 
Smith (1994) states that a hermeneutic method of inquiry must be 
reflective of the context within which is it conducted. Data analysis or 
presentation of the dialogue has taken many different forms, again within 
the spirit of the respect for interpretation. Thematic moments (Bergum 
1989), stories (McIntyre, Anderson & McDonald 2001), and music 
(Gadow 1999) are examples of how context has influenced the sharing of 
information within a “hermeneutic circle.” 
Benner (1994) offers the following context that again supports the 
action of allowing interpretation to emerge: 
 
Learning the skills of interpretive phenomenology comes much 
more easily once the ontological concerns are recovered and the 
researcher is able to shift from questions about what it is to know 
(epistemology) to questions about why and how we “know” 
some things and not others and what constitutes our knowing 
(ontology). The dialogical process of learning to create, 
understand, and interpret texts begins with preexisting abilities to 
understand world, read texts for meaning, and extend those 
everyday capacities with rigor and attentiveness to interpretive 
research (p. 103).  
 
Once again, returning to the analogy of the fibers in the thread, I 
believe that the idea of interpretation will challenge researchers to look 
versus see. Although there are many ideas of interpretation which shape 
how research is conducted, interpretation in hermeneutic–
phenomenological work supports a process, rather than a method. This 
process involves the fibers of lived experience, meaning, understanding 
and language. It is respect, belief in the process and consideration of the 
fibers that will allow interpretation to guide the process and allow new 
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